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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BANK OF SALT LAKE, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CORPORATION OF THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-
DAY SAINTS, a Utah 
corporation sole, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following supplementary facts are set forth to 
assist the Court with the argument which follows. 
There are four loan transactions relevant to this 
case. The timing of these transactions is best described by 
reference to Appendix A. For each loan transaction, the 
date of the assignment, as shown on the assignment in-
strument is given in the first column, the date of the 
making of the note as shown on the face of the note is 
Case No. 
13704 
1 
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given in the second, the date of the letter from the Bank to 
Leland Bruderer, as typed at the top of the letter, is given 
in the third, and the date opposite the signature of Brud-
erer at the bottom of the letter is given in the fourth col-
umn. The trial exhibit number evidencing the loan trans-
action is given in the final column. 
In each of these cases the assignments were not made 
until after the letter, intended as a notice of assignment, 
had been returned. The assignment relating to loan # 1 is 
undated. However, the note was made on August 14, 1968, 
one day after the letter was made and the Bruderer signa-
ture obtained. As for loan #2, the letter and the assignment 
bear the same date. For loan #3, the assignment is un-
dated. However, the letter was made on March 7 and 
signed by Bruderer on March 16, while the note itself was 
not made until March 17. The assignment itself shows 
that the assignment was made after the making of the 
March 7 letter since the assignment refers to "invoices as 
listed in letter of March 7, 1969 . . . ." The assignment 
relating to loan #4 was made on March 26, 1969, while 
the letter was dated five days earlier, March 21. At the 
time that Cook took the letters to Bruderer for each of 
the four loan transactions, no assignment instrument nor 
other supporting documents were attached to the letter 
(R. 50-52). The reason that no supporting documents 
were attached is that none had been made at the time the 
letters were given to Bruderer. The testimony reveals 
that the loans were conditioned upon the obtaining of an 
"acknowledgment" (R. 21). The testimony of Mr. Norton 
Parker, the President of the Bank of Salt Lake, shows that 
3 
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for at least some of the loan transactions the Bank of Salt 
Lake had not yet extended credit nor received assignments 
of the proceeds of invoices before making representations 
to the contrary in the letters given to Bruderer. (R. 168). 
Appendices B through E summarize the assignments, 
letters and invoices involved in the loan transactions. 
In several places in the Respondent's Brief, it is 
stated that Bruderer executed the assignments in these 
transactions (Respondent's Brief 17, 20). It is obvious that 
Mr. Bruderer did not make any assignments. 
With respect to Aldon Cook's dealings with the Bank, 
the Bank typed Bruderer's name on the form letters upon 
the recommendation of Cook (R. 47). Cook gave Brud-
erer's name to the Bank because he felt Bruderer would 
sign the letters (R. 47). Cook believed Bruderer was his 
best friend within the Church (R. 47). Paul West, the 
Assistant Vice-President of the Bank, delivered the pre-
pared letters to Cook with directions to take them to 
Bruderer (R. 48). 
Bruderer is not the only person with whom Aldon 
Cook had contact on behalf of The Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints (Church). Bruderer was just part 
of the total picture. Cook dealt with the Purchasing 
Department as well (R. 9, 64). The invoices sent to 
the Church also show that Cook was dealing with an 
entity other than Institutes and Seminaries. Most of the 
invoices show the purchaser to be the L.D.S. Building 
Department. 
3 
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When Cook took the letters to Bruderer for his signa-
ture he, Cook, explained that he needed help in getting a 
loan from the Bank (R. 104). Bruderer made it clear at 
that point, and Cook understood, that Bruderer had no 
authority to acknowledge any assignments on behalf of 
the Church. (R. 43, 44, 104). After Bruderer explained to 
Cook that he had no authority to sign the acknowledg-
ment or direct payment by check to the Bank of Salt Lake, 
Cook told Bruderer that he would see that all invoices 
would have the name of the Bank of Salt Lake on them 
(R. 104). It was upon this understanding that Bruderer 
signed the letters. 
Regarding the October 19, 1969, letter from the Bank 
to Bruderer, Bruderer called Cook immediately after re-
ceiving the letter because Cook was the only person from 
the Bank that Bruderer had ever worked with regarding 
the transaction. He was informed by Cook that the letter 
was written in error and that Cook would call the Bank 
(R. 108). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BRUDERER HAD NO APPARENT AUTHOR-
ITY TO ACKNOWLEDGE INDEBTEDNESS 
OR AGREE TO ASSIGNMENTS OF AC-
COUNTS RECEIVABLE ON BEHALF OF THE 
DEFENDANT 
In its initial brief, the Appellant has set forth its 
argument that Bruderer had neither actual nor apparent 
authority to act in behalf of the Defendant-Appellant, 
4 
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However, Respondent in Point II of his brief, makes 
the argument that Bruderer did have apparent authority 
to acknowledge indebtedness or to agree to assignments 
for the benefit of the Defendant. Although the argument 
heading states that Bruderer had apparent authority to 
receive the notice of assignment, the argument is extended 
to the point of contending that he had apparent authority 
to acknowledge corporate indebtedness and agree to 
assignments on behalf of the Defendant. 
It is true, as the Respondent states, that a corporation 
is bound by the acts of its officers and agents acting within 
the apparent scope of their authority. However, the Re-
spondent fails to mention the equally important agency 
principle that a person dealing with an agent must use 
reasonable diligence and prudence to ascertain whether 
the agent acts within the scope of his powers, and is there-
fore presumed to know the extent of the agent's authority. 
19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1165 at 592 (1965). 
The real question as to Bruderer's apparent authority 
to transact business for the Defendant is whether the De-
fendant has held Bruderer out or permitted him to act for 
the Defendant in such a way as to justify a third person 
dealing with him to assume that he is going an act within 
the scope of his authority. An agent may not by his own 
actions establish his scope of authority. 
The question is9 then, what has the Defendant done 
to make it appear that Bruderer is an agent for the De-
fendant for the purpose of acknowledging corporate debts 
or agreeing to assignments? At no time prior to the in-
5 
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stant loan transactions had Bruderer ever acknowledged 
corporate indebtedness or agreed to assignments on be-
half of the Defendant. There is no past pattern of these 
activities that would indicate to Cook or to the Plaintiff 
Bank that Bruderer had any authority to accomplish these 
objectives. Neither had he at any time communicated with 
anyone regarding the form in which the checks were to be 
paid. Bruderer's duties were for the most part limited to in-
ternal clerical functions of the Institutes and Seminaries, 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church). 
His sole nonclerical function was recommending various 
types or brands of school furniture and fixtures for, and 
estimating the aggregate costs of furnishing any given 
room in, a specific seminary or institute. He had no con-
trol over pricing or returning defective merchandise. 
Neither did he issue requisition forms to the Purchasing 
or Building Departments of the Church, although he did 
prepare the requisitions in proper form for approval and 
signature by his immediate supervisor. While he believed 
that his recommendations were generally approved, he 
had no way of controlling whether any particular requisi-
tion was approved or rejected or whether any resulting 
invoice was a valid one. 
The Defendant did nothing to hold Bruderer out as a 
person to contact regarding acknowledgment of corporate 
debts or assignments, or having checks made payable in a 
certain manner. Nor did the Defendant allow Bruderer 
to carry on any activities that would lead one to believe 
that he had any authority to do these things. Therefore, 
it follows that he had no apparent authority to conduct 
any of these matters for the Defendant. Any appearances 
6 
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received by the Plaintiff Bank were not those generated 
by the Defendant. Cook, on behalf of the Plaintiff Bank, 
knew that Bruderer had no such authority. If it appeared 
to Paul West, Assistant Vice-President of the Bank, that 
Bruderer had such authority, such an appearance was 
generated by Cook himself and not the Defendant. 
The cases cited by the Respondent, Harrison v. Auto 
Securities Corp., 70 Utah 11, 257 P. 677 (1927) and Santi 
v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R., 21 Utah 2d 157,442 P.2d 
921 (1968), both involved apparent authority but are both 
distinguishable from this case. The Harrison case in-
volved the purchase by a widow of a used car from a Mr. 
Clark in Price. The widow did not know that Clark had 
no actual authority to sell the car, it having been given to 
Clark from the Graham Company for the purpose of ex-
hibiting it only. The court, noting that there was some 
sort of agency agreement between Clark and the Graham 
Company that had not been entered into the record and 
that previously Clark's company had purchased other cars 
from the Graham Company for resale at Price, held that 
Clark had apparent authority to sell the automobile to 
the widow. Unlike the instant case, in Harrison, the 
Graham Company, by its actions of selling outright other 
automobiles to Clark's company, gave the appearance to 
third parties that Clark had the actual authority to sell 
that particular automobile. The Graham Company, there-
fore was estopped from complaining that the particular 
automobile sold by Clark was not in his possession for 
resale. 
7 
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Furthermore, the Harrison court concluded that when 
one of two innocent parties must suffer from the wrong-
ful act of a third person, the loss should fall on the one 
that allowed the third party to perpetrate the wrong. 
The Respondent states that if the Defendant and the Bank 
be considered two innocent parties, then the Defendant, 
being the party that allowed the wrong to be committed, 
should be the party to bear the loss. However, the Plain-
tiff Bank fails to realize that its conduct was an even 
greater contributing factor in allowing the transaction to 
proceed than the Defendant. Here we have an Assistant 
Vice-President of a bank allowing a potential debtor to 
designate the person upon whom notice of the assign-
ments should be given. Without making even a cursory 
examination of Bruderer's authority, he has a letter typed 
and addressed to Bruderer informing him of the intended 
assignment and requesting his acknowledgment at the 
bottom. To complicate matters, he does not send he letter 
through the normal channels of the U.S. mail, but allows 
Cook, the person making the designation in the first place, 
to hand-deliver the letter to Bruderer and obtain his signa-
ture largely on the basis of assurances that Cook will see 
that the Plaintiff Bank is satisfied. The point is that 
the Plaintiff Bank, by allowing Cook virtually to 
take over the transaction for the Plaintiff Bank, shirked 
its responsibilities of verifying the authority of the person 
receiving the letter and of seeing that no slight of hand was 
performed by Cook. These acts by the Plaintiff Bank can 
be contrasted with those of Bruderer, a low-level em-
ployee, of signing a letter for a business acquaintance to help 
him get a loan when he was assured by him that he 
* 
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would handle all the arrangements. Clearly, it was the 
Plaintiff Bank's acts of allowing Cook to designate Brud-
erer that allowed the loss to occur. 
The Santi case similarly does not help the Respondent. 
In Santi, the plaintiff made a bid to purchase freight-
damaged merchandise from a railroad company. The 
plaintiff gave his offer to a railroad agent at the scene 
who relayed the offer by direct line to the railroad's home 
office. The plaintiff stated that the railroad agent later 
informed him that the company had accepted his offer, 
although the company denied accepting the offer. 
The plaintiff knew that the agent had no authority of his 
own to accept the offers without company approval. The 
railroad company itself did nothing to induce the plaintiff 
to believe that it had accepted the offer. Hence, the court 
held that the agent had no apparent authority to accept 
an offer. Similarly, since the Defendant did nothing to 
induce the Plaintiff Bank to believe Bruderer had any 
authority to receive notices of assignments, acknowledge 
corporate indebtedness, or agree to the method of pay-
ment of any assignment, Bruderer had no such apparent 
authority. 
The Respondent concludes that the Defendant is 
estopped to deny the apparent authority with which it 
allegedly clothed Bruderer. It is seen, however, that 
Bruderer had no apparent authority to conduct the par-
ticular transactions involved for the Defendant, nor did 
he have actual authority to do so. As such, the estoppel 
principle is not applicable and the Defendant has every 
right to deny that Bruderer acted in its behalf in "acknowl-
edging* ' the assignments. 
9 
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The Respondent makes several incorrect statements at 
the close of his argument in Point II concerning the author-
ity of Bruderer (Respondent's Brief 17-20)). The evidence 
shows that Bruderer was not responsible for the requisi-
tioning and ordering of furnishings and equipment for all 
seminaries and institutes within the Church during 1968 
and 1969. It is not true that he dealt with Kerry-Aldon 
Associates for the purpose of obtaining various items of 
furniture and equipment nor is it true that any trans-
action with Kerry-Aldon was consumated in Bruderer's 
office. It is not true that he in fact ordered certain 
items from Kerry-Aldon Associates in order to furnish 
seminary and institute buildings. It is not true that the 
Church placed Bruderer in a position of authority with 
the Seminaries and Institutes Division and authorized 
him to order and requisition office furnishings and equip-
ment. It is not true that Bruderer had apparent authority 
to execute acknowledgments of assignments on behalf of 
the Church. Neither is it true that Bruderer made no men-
tion of any lack of authority to the Plaintiff Bank or any-
one else. The evidence makes it clear that the only person 
representing the Plaintiff Bank to contact Bruderer was 
Cook, who brought the letter of the Plaintiff Bank to 
Bruderer, who in turn told Cook he had no authority to 
receive or sign such a letter. 
Further, the Plaintiff Bank cannot categorize itself as 
an innocent third party deceived by the alleged apparent 
authority of Bruderer. The Plaintiff Bank, unlike the 
widow in Harrison, supra, did not act in good faith. In 
this situation where notice to the debtor is crucial, "good 
faith" ordinarily includes (1) the absence of any actual 
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knowledge that would indicate that a manner of giving 
notice would not be effective, and (2) the use of means 
of communication that are commercially reasonable. 
1 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201:82 at 
115 (2d ed. 1970). It is submitted that allowing Cook to 
hand-deliver the letter to a person he himself designated 
was not a commercially reasonable means of communica-
tion, especially considering the high standard of care 
and caution required of sophisticated lending institutions. 
POINT II 
COOK HAD ACTUAL AND APPARENT 
AUTHORITY FROM PLAINTIFF TO TAKE 
THE NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT AND RE-
CEIVE AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT THEREOF, 
AND COOKS KNOWLEDGE THAT BRUD-
ERER HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ACKNOW-
LEDGE THE ASSIGNMENT SHOULD BE IM-
PUTED TO THE PLAINTIFF BANK 
The Plaintiff Bank claims that Bruderer made no 
mention of his lack of authority to the Plaintiff Bank or 
anyone else over a three month period (Respondent's Brief 
at 20). In fact, Bruderer did mention the lack of authority 
to Cook, the only person from the Bank he had dealt 
with in the transaction. Cook's knowledge of this should 
be imputed to the Plaintiff Bank. 
Usually the assignee of accounts receivable has the 
duty of notifying the account debtor that the account has 
II 
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been assigned and that payments should be made directly 
to the assignee. The Plaintiff Bank delegated that duty 
to Cook. By doing so, the Plaintiff Bank made Cook its 
agent for the purpose of delivering the notice of assign-
ment and receiving a corporate acknowledgment from a 
person in the organization having proper authority. Cook 
had actual authority from the Bank to perform these func-
tions. 
Further, he had apparent authority to do these things 
since he brought with him in his dealings with Bruderer, 
letters bearing the letterhead of the Plaintiff Bank of Salt 
Lake and the signature of its Assistant Vice-President, 
Paul West. Third persons dealing with Cook would thus 
obtain the correct impression that he had authority from 
the Plaintiff Bank to conduct that particular transaction. 
In the course of the very transaction that Cook was 
apparently and actually authorized to carry out, Cook re-
ceived direct knowledge from Bruderer that he, Bruderer, 
was not the proper party to handle the transaction: 
I explained to Mr. Cook at the time when he 
first made the contact that I did not have authority 
to sign for the Corporation of the President and to 
have checks made out to the bank. . . . 
(R. 104, 1. 21-24). As such, the Plaintiff Bank had notice 
that Bruderer had no authority in the transaction. It is a 
well settled rule 
"that notice to an agent of facts arising from, or 
connected with, the subject-matter of the agency 
- is constructive notice to the principle, when the 
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, notice comes to the agent while he is concerned 
for the principle {sic.}, and in the course of the 
very transaction." - H *^ > 
Renton v. Monnier, 11 Cal. 449, 19 P. 820, 822 (1888). 
In specific application, it is well-established that the 
knowledge of an agent of a bank, whether he is president, 
cashier or some other person, is knowledge of the bank 
that he represents in the transaction performed by him 
within the scope of his authority. 3 Fletcher, Private Cor-
porations § 806.1 at 55 (rev. vol. 1965). 
Therefore, the Plaintiff Bank had knowledge that 
Bruderer had no authority to acknowledge the assign-
ment and have checks made payable to the Plaintiff Bank. 
As such, the Plaintiff Bank should be estopped from 
claiming that Bruderer had either actual or apparent 
authority to do such things. 
POINT HI 
THE FOUR LETTERS RECEIVED BY BRUD-
ERER DO NOT EVEN CONSTITUTE NO-
TICES OF ASSIGNMENTS SINCE THEY 
WERE MADE BEFORE THE RESPECTIVE 
ASSIGNMENTS WERE MADE 
In Respondent's brief the case of Time Finance Cor-
poration v. Johnson Trucking Co., 23 Utah 2d 115, 458 
P.2d 873 (1969), is extensively cited in support of its 
argument. That case is clearly distinguishable respecting 
those points urged by the Respondent, and an analysis of 
that decision is supportive of Defendant's position, in that 
the Time Finance court stated by way of instruction to 
13 
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the trial court that notice of intended assignment, given 
before an assignment is actually made, is not notice of the 
assignment whatsoever. 
Since the Respondent's statement of facts in the 
Time Finance case is somewhat inaccurate, a detailed 
analysis will be beneficial. 
Johnson Trucking Company, through its agent, Max-
well, approached Time Finance Corporation in order to 
obtain a loan. Maxwell informed it that he would soon 
receive the insurance proceeds from a wrecked truck. Be-
fore Time Finance would loan the money with the insur-
ance proceeds as collateral, Time Finance requested that 
Maxwell obtain a letter from Mang, a general agent of 
Occidental, stating that Time's name would be put on the 
checks from Occidental. Maxwell went to Mang and 
stated that he needed a letter in order to borrow money. 
Mang wrote a letter to Time Finance stating that he ad-
justment of the claim was pending at that time and that, 
in any event, Time Finance would be shown as the loss 
payee on any claim draft. All of this was done before an 
assignment had been made. Upon receiving the letter 
from Mang, Time Finance loaned the money to Maxwell 
upon a collateral assignment of the insurance proceeds. 
The receipt of such a letter by Time Finance was clearly 
a condition precedent to the loan and the assignment. The 
Court states that there is nothing in the record to indicate 
that Time Finance subsequently notified Occidental of the 
assignment of the insurance proceeds. 
The Court describes the requirements of a notice of 
assignment: 
14 
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Maxwell contacted Mang for the purpose of 
procuring a letter to Time Finance prior to the 
loan transaction. Time Finance, after the execu-
tion of the assignment by Maxwell, did not give 
notice to either Mang or Occidental. 
A notice of intended assignment is not notice 
of a subsequent assignment. * * 
# * * b u t a n assignee, in order to protect 
himself, cannot remain silent. * * * But in order 
to protect his rights, the assignee must notify the 
debtor of the assignment, since the latter is entitled 
to setoffs and defenses he may have or may acquire 
against the assignor, until he is notified of the 
assignment. * * . 
23 Utah 2d at 119, 458 P.2d at 875-76. 
The similarity of facts of the Time Finance case and 
the present case is striking. Kerry-Aldon, Inc., through 
Aldon Cook, approached the Plaintiff Bank of Salt Lake 
for the purpose of borrowing money. As collateral, Kerry-
Aldon, Inc. was willing to put up the proceeds of in-
voices that it expected to receive soon. The Plaintiff Bank 
requested that Cook acquire a written acknowledgment 
from the Church stating that the Bank's name would be 
put on the checks issued in payment of the invoices. Cook 
went to Bruderer and stated that he needed the acknowl-
edgment signed in order to borrow money. It appears 
that obtaining a signed acknowledgment from the Church 
was a condition precedent to the loan and assignment 
transaction: 
Q (By Mr. Kipp) And isn't it true, Mr. Cook, 
that you told Mr. Bruderer on each occasion you 
needed to have these acknowledgement of assign-
ments in order to get your money? 
A That is true. 
15 
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Q You advised him that was a condition of your 
loaning procedure with the Bank? 
A He understood that. 
R. 34, 1. 3-9. The evidence also shows that at the 
time Bruderer signed the letters, no assignment or loan 
had actually been made: 
Q Mr. Parker, referring to "Exhibit 2-P-C," 
which is a letter dated August 13, 1968, your testi-
mony, I assume, would be that contrary to the 
statement indicated in the first paragraph of that 
letter, that Kerry-Aldon Associates did not — that 
the Bank of Salt Lake did not extend credit to 
Kerry-Aldon Associates as so indicated in the letter? 
A Correct. 
Q And also is it not correct — Also it is correct 
contrary to the representations in the letter that 
the bank, that Karry-Aldon {sic] Associates had 
not assigned the proceeds of their invoices as writ-
ten on the letter? 
A Correct. 
R. 168, 1. 8-19. As in the Time Finance case, there 
is no evidence in the record to indicate that the 
Plaintiff Bank ever notified the Defendant or Church of 
the assignment after the assignment had been made. See 
Appendix A. Assuming for argument that the Bank had 
given notification concerning an assignment that it in-
tended to take, it never notified the Church or Defendant 
that an assignment had actually been made. 
Therefore, even if the notices were to be considered 
as received by the Defendant or the Church, they were not 
proper notices of assignments, as no assignments had yet 
16 
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been made. The reason for requiring the assignee to be 
precise and exact in his notice to the account debtor is 
found in the history of assignments: 
The substitution of a new creditor is in derogation 
of the rights of the debtor, and was strictly pro-
hibited by the ancient rules of the common law. It 
is only by relaxation of those rules, in deference 
to the convenience of trade, that such assignments 
have been recognized at all . . . . 
Skobis v. Verge, 102 Wis. 122, 78 N.W. 426, 428 (1899). 
Williston, as quoted in Time Finance, further elaborates 
on the requirements and reasons for exactness in giving 
notices of assignment: 
"The fact, however, of such substitution of a 
new creditor must, in order to make the debtor 
liable to the assignee, be brought home to the deb-
tor with much exactness and certainty before he 
has paid the debt. The rule of notice to him is 
much more stringent than that which may defeat 
the title of a purchaser of a chose in action or of 
real estate. The latter is free to purchase or refuse 
to purchase as he chooses, and therefore it is his 
duty, before acting, to trace out any reasonable 
doubt and to inform himself of the true facts as 
soon as anything arises to put him on inquiry. But 
the debtor is not so situated. He must pay to his 
original creditor when the debt is due, unless he 
can establish affirmatively that someone else has a 
better right. The notice to him, therefore, must be 
of so exact and specific a character as to convince 
him that he is no longer liable to such original 
creditor, and to place in his hands the means of 
defense against him, or at least the information 
necessary to interplead the assignee." 
23 Utah 2d at 120, 458 P.2d at 876-77. 
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The Respondent attempts to use the Time Finance 
case to show that knowledge received by Bruderer should 
be imputed to the Church just as knowledge to Mang, the 
general agent for Occidental was imputed to Occidental. 
With regards to this contention, Time Finance can be 
distinguished in two ways. First, Mang was a general in-
surance agent for Occidental who doubtless had authority 
to receive notices of transactions involving all aspects of 
the insurance business. Bruderer, on the other hand, had 
only very limited responsibility in a specific division of 
one department of the Church. It was not part of his duty 
to process notices of assignments or to see that checks were 
made payable to a particular payee. Mang undoubtedly 
was responsible for processing these types of transactions. 
Not all knowledge received by an agent is constructive 
notice to the principal. It is only when the notice comes 
to the agent while he is concerned for the principal and in 
the course of the very transaction over which he had 
authority that knowledge of the agent is constructive no-
tice to the principal. Renton v. Monnier, 77 Cal. 449, 19 
P. 820, 822 (1888). In the Renton case, the court held 
that notice to an architect employed by the defendant 
that a building contractor, who was working on a building 
over which the architect had charge, had assigned his 
right of payment to another party did not arise from nor 
was connected with the subject-matter of the agency of 
the architect and hence, the defendant was not on notice of 
the assignment. Similarly, Bruderer did not have authority 
to receive notices of assignments nor to have checks made 
payable to certain payees. Neither did he have general 
authority for the Church or Defendant. Therefore, neither 
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the Church nor Defendant should be held to be on con-
structive notice that an assignment had been made. 
Second, the effectiveness of the receipt of a notice by 
an organization should be determined in light of the de-
finitions of the Uniform Commercial Code. The liability 
to an assignee is governed by section 70A-9-318(3) of the 
Utah Code. Whether a debtor is obligated to make pay-
ments to a subsequent assignee depends upon whether 
the assignee has notified the debtor in such a way that 
reasonably identifies the rights assigned. 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THE LETTERS RECEIVED BY 
BRUDERER CONSTITUTE NOTICES OF 
ASSIGNMENT, THE NOTICES WERE NEVER 
RECEIVED BY THE DEFENDANT, AS NO-
TICE TO AN ORGANIZATION IS DEFINED 
BY THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
The Uniform Commercial Code continues in effect 
the prior law that an account debtor is authori2ed to pay 
the assignor until the account debtor receives notification 
(that reasonably identifies the rights assigned) that the 
account has been assigned and that payment is to be made 
to the assignee. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1968). 
In the absence of such a reasonably identified notice of 
assignment, the account debtor may continue to pay the 
assignor. See Taubenhaus v. Jung Factors, Inc., 478 
S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). 
The date that a notice is effectively received by an 
organization is defined by the UCC: 
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Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification 
received by an organization is effective for a par-
ticular transaction from the time when it is brought 
to the attention of the individual conducting that 
transaction, and in any event from the time when 
it would have been brought to his attention if the 
organization had exercised due diligence. An or-
ganization exercises due diligence if it maintains 
reasonable routines for communicating significant 
information to the person conducting the trans-
action and there is reasonable compliance with 
the routines. Due diligence does not require an 
individual acting for the organization to communi-
cate information unless such communication is part 
of his regular duties or unless he has reason to 
know of the transaction and that the transaction 
would be materially affected by the information. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-20K27) (1968) (emphasis added). 
The crucial question in applying this section of the 
UCC and the agency principles already discussed is the 
meaning of the word "transaction." Identifying the "trans-
action' ' in this particular situation is facilitated by de-
termining the purpose for the notice. The purpose of a 
notice of assignment is to inform the account debtor that 
he is now legally responsible to pay his debt directly to the 
assignee, unless he is informed otherwise in the notice. 
He must see that all payments on the debt are made 
directly to the assignee. Since the account debtor 
is not involved in the assignment itself, its only part in 
the "transaction" is to see that the checks it issues are made 
payable to the assignee. The "transaction" in this case 
then, was making the Plaintiff Bank a payee on checks 
issued. This was the concern of the Bank and the precise 
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reason that it sent the notice to Bruderer via Cook in the 
first place. 
The definition states that the notice is effective when 
it is brought to the attention of the individual conducting 
that transaction. Because the "transaction" in this case 
consisted of having checks issued with the Bank as a 
joint payee, Bruderer clearly was not the person con-
ducting that transaction. The individual conducting that 
transaction would have been an officer of the Defendant 
authorized to conduct its financial affairs. Even if the 
"transaction" were considered to have been the various 
sales indicated on the invoices, Bruderer was still not the 
person conducting the transaction because he did not 
have the authority to issue purchase orders nor enter into 
purchase contracts. He was limited to making recom-
mendations as to what manufacturers' lines should be 
purchased and had no knowledge whether any particular 
invoice represented a valid debt owed by the Church. 
While higher-level employees of the Seminary and In-
stitutes Division often requisitioned furnishings, the pur-
chase orders were issued by the Church Purchasing De-
partment. The Kerry-Aldon, Inc. invoices themselves us-
ually show the purchaser to be the Church Building De-
partment. 
The word "transaction" certainly cannot refer to the 
receipt of notice, as Respondent contends, because any per-
son that receives the notice would automatically become 
the person conducting the "transaction," thereby making 
notice effective when it is served on any person in the or-
ganization, clearly not the intent of the UCC. 
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Because the notice was not received by the proper 
financial officer of the Defendant, the notice would only 
be effective from the time when it would have been 
brought to his attention had "due diligence" been exer-
cised. The final sentence of the definition states that due 
diligence does not require an employee of an organiza-
tion to communicate information given to him unless one 
of the following is true: (1) such communication is part of 
his regular duties or (2) he has reason to know of the 
transaction and he has reason to know that the trans-
action would be materially affected by the information. 
Anderson discusses this aspect of due diligence as ap-
proached from the individual's obligation: 
Under the standard of due diligence, the organi-
zation's personnel are not required to volunteer in-
formation merely because they know of it. Only 
in two types of cases does due diligence require 
that an individual acting for the organization com-
municate information which is significant in its re-
lationship to a given transaction: the duty to com-
municate known information exists if it is a part 
of such person's regular duties to communicate 
the information in question or he has reason to 
know of the transaction and that it would be 
materially affected by the information. 
1 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201:87 at 
120 (2d ed. 1970). 
Was it part of Bruderer's regular duty to communi-
cate with the financial officer of the Defendant or any-
one else regarding notices of assignments? Clearly not. 
Bruderer's responsibilities, for the most part, were cen-
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tered around the internal operations of the institutes and 
seminaries. It was never his responsibility to communi-
cate such information to the financial officer of the De-
fendant, whose office was not even in the same building. 
If Bruderer did not communicate information as part 
of his regular duties, did he have reason to "know of the 
transaction?" When he received the letters from Cook 
and saw that various invoice numbers were listed in the 
letters, he did not know whether those were valid in-
voices that the Church had an obligation to pay. He had 
no reason to know whether the Church had purchased any 
particular items of furnishings from Kerry-Aldon be-
cause he only recommended but did not have authority 
to actually order the furnishings. Hence, he did not really 
"know of the transaction." 
However, even if it is considered that Bruderer had 
reason to "know of the transaction" he did not have reason 
to know "that the transaction would be materially affected 
by the information." In fact, he had reason to believe 
that the transaction would not be materially affected by 
the information because Cook, carrying a letter from the 
Bank and bearing the apparent authority to conduct the 
transaction, informed Bruderer that he would make sure 
that all invoices bore the name of the Bank of Salt Lake 
(R. 104). 
In other words, Bruderer was told by an agent of the 
Bank that it would not be necessary for him to do any 
more regarding the transaction, but that the Bank would 
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see that it received its payments. Thus, Bruderer relied on 
the representations of Cook. , 
Therefore, "due diligence" did not require Bruderer 
to communicate this information with anyone else. The 
consequence of this is stated by Anderson: 
If there is no duty on the part of the employee to 
communicate, it is apparent that the reasonable 
time, at the expiration of which the person in 
charge of the transaction is to be charged with no-
tice or knowledge, did not begin to run when that 
employee received the notice or acquired the knowl-
edge. 
1 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201:87 at 
119-20 (2d ed. 1970). Hence, unless the individual con-
ducting the transaction receives the notice independent of 
communication from the person receiving that notice who 
has no duty to communicate it, the organization never 
effectively receives the notice. Such is the case here. An-
derson explains: 
By inference, the Code provides that the no-
tice or knowledge is not effective when received 
or acquired by the agent or employee and expressly 
declares that it is effective from the time when the 
person conducting the transaction to which the 
notice or knowledge relates learns of such notice 
or acquires such knowledge . . . . 
1 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201:86 at 
117-18 (2d ed. 1970). 
The Respondent incorrectly states that section 70A-1-
201 (26) (b) of the Utah Code indicates that notices de-
livered to Mr. Bruderer's office are the same as notices 
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received by the Church. The import of that section is that 
if a notice is delivered to an office where a particular con-
tract was made or an office held out by a person as a 
place for receipt of such communications, then that per-
son effectively receives notice. In other words, if Bruderer 
had not been in his office when Cook arrived with the 
letter, and Cook left the letter at Bruderer's office, this 
section of the Code would say that Bruderer effectively 
has received the notice. It does not say that the Church 
or Defendant has effectively received the notice. Whether 
the Defendant has received such a notice depends upon 
other law previously argued. 
The Respondent also cites several cases dealing with 
notice to an organization. Each of these cases is distinguish-
able. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 40,440 P.2d 15 (1968), 
is not governed by the UCC since the assignment took 
place in 1961, before enactment of the UCC in Utah. 
Further, the mayor of a city is not in the same position as 
Bruderer, since the mayor is the chief executive officer of 
the city and is affirmatively charged by statute with the 
duty of giving the council information relative to the 
business of the city. In Ertel v. RCA, 307 N.E.2d 471 (Ind. 
1974), the written notice of assignment was sent by certi-
fied mail and received by a dock employee as evidenced 
by his signature. The mail was normally delivered to the 
receiving dock and dock employees were authorized to 
sign receipts for certified mail. Therefore, it was the dock 
employee's regular duty to communicate the notice. In 
Gateway National Bank v. Saxe, Bacon and Bolan, 40 
App. Div. 2d 653, 336 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1972), the partner 
receiving the notice was the senior partner of the de-
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fendant law firm. He was also the chairman of the board 
of directors for the plaintiff. He forwarded to the plain-
tiff bank, for signature, on the defendant's stationery, 
a UCC financing statement covering the assignment. 
Bruderer is certainly not in the position of this senior 
law partner. Similarly, Boulevard National Bank v. Gulf 
American Land Corp., 179 So. 2d 584, 586 (Fla. App. 
1965), is not applicable. In Boulevard, liability was based 
upon the acknowledgment of the assignment by an 
assistant treasurer of the defendant. Bruderer has no 
similar authority to acknowledge assignments on behalf 
of the Church or Defendant. 
The Respondent also lists from Fletcher types of em-
ployees to whom notice was given which bound the cor-
poration. Suffice it to say that an examination of the cases 
involving these employees shows that the information re-
ceived by them was directly apropos to their regular duties. 
With like ease Fletcher can be quoted in support of the 
appellant: 
On the other hand, in particular cases, notice 
to or knowledge of the following persons was 
held not imputable to the corporation . . . janitor 
of depot, . . . timekeeper and shipping clerk, 
though styled "chief clerk," . . . . 
3 W. Fletcher, Private Corporations § 807 at 65-66 (rev. 
vol.1965). 
POINT V 
THE DEFENDANT CANNOT BE LIABLE ON 
THE BASIS OF THE GENERAL ASSIGN-
MENT OF ACCOUNTS BECAUSE IT RECEIV-
ED N O NOTICE OF SUCH AN ASSIGN-
MENT 
m Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Subsequent to the four loan transactions discussed 
above, the Bank obtained a general assignment of 
accounts from Kerry-Aldon, Inc., upon which a UCC 
filing was made. Neither the Defendant, the Church, 
nor any agent or employee of either was ever given notice 
of the general assignment. 
It is the Respondent's position that the general filing 
with the Secretary of State is adequate notice to bind an 
account debtor to make payments to the assignee. Such a 
position is absurd. Certainly it is true that such a filing is 
sufficient to protect the Bank as against subsequent 
assignees. However, in order to bind the account debtor, 
he must receive actual notice that reasonably identifies 
the rights being assigned. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318 
(3) (1968). If a general UCC filing were adequate to make 
the account debtor liable to the assignee, then no consumer 
would be safe in paying his gas or electric bill until he 
check the UCC filings with the Secretary of State to see 
whether the utility companies had assigned the pro-
ceeds of their accounts receivable. Such a contention de-
serves no further comment. 
POINT VI 
IN ANY EVENT, THE DEFENDANT'S LIA-
BILITY ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF IN-
VOICE NO. 1171 SHOULD BE NO GREAT-
ER THAN THE FACE AMOUNT OF THAT 
INVOICE 
The Respondent, after asserting in its brief that 
acknowledgment of an assignment is not necessary in 
order to bind a debtor and that notice to the debtor is 
27 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sufficient, reverts to the argument re invoice 1171 that 
Bruderer, on behalf of the Defendant, acknowledged the 
indebtedness for the full amount of $34,966. However, as 
mentioned previously, Bruderer had no actual or apparent 
authority to acknowledge any indebtedness on behalf of 
the Church or Defendant. 
For loan no. 4, the letter to Bruderer states that 
Kerry-Aldon Associates had assigned the proceeds of in-
voice no. 1171 in the amount of $34,966. In fact, the 
assignment makes no mention of invoice no. 1171 and is 
signed by Aldon Cook in his individual capacity. Invoice 
no. 1171 was a blank form in Cook's office at the time 
of the loan transaction and, in fact, was later filled in 
in the amount of $85.00. 
Even if it is held that the Defendant had notice of 
this assignment, it should not be responsible for paying 
$34,966 to the Bank on the basis of the letter of notifica-
tion from the Bank. The letter states that the proceeds 
of invoice no. 1171 had been assigned. In searching for 
that invoice, it would have been found that it was only 
for an amount of $85.00. The Defendant should have no 
further liability than to pay the $85.00 to the Bank. 
As mentioned previously, great exactness and pre-
ciseness is required in notices of assignments. The De-
fendant should not have been put in a position of paying 
more than it was obligated to pay directly to the Bank, 
because the assignor might have claimed that only $85.00 
should have been paid directly to the Bank. It is unfair 
to put the Defendant in such a position and it was mani-
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fest upon the Bank to specify with preciseness what pro-
ceeds were being assigned. As stated in the UCC: A notifi-
cation which does not reasonably identify the rights 
assigned is ineffective. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318 
(3) (1968). 
Other arguments regarding invoice 1171 and the 
Defendant's contention that it has no liability in respect 
thereto, are set forth in the initial brief of the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons heretofore argued in the Brief and 
Reply Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, the judgment 
of the lower court in favor of the Plaintiff-Respondent 
should be reversed, and the Defendant-Appellant should 
be awarded judgment and its costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND W. GEE 
J. DOUGLAS MITCHELL 
DAVID A. WESTERBY 
of and for 
KIRTON, McCONKIE, 
BOYER & BOYLE 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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APPENDIX A 
Timing Sequences of Loan Transactions 
Loan # l i 
Loan # 2 
Loan # 3 
Loan # 4 
Assignment 
Undated 
Jan. 15, 1969 
Undated2 
Mar. 26,1969 
Note 
Aug. 14, 1969 
Jan. 15,1969 
Mar. 17, 1969 
Mar. 26,1969 
Letter3 
Aug. 13,1968 
Jan. 15,1969 
Mar. 7,1969 
Mar. 21,1969 
Signature4 
Aug. 13,1968 
Jan. 15,1969 
Mar. 16,1969 
Mar. 26,1969 
Exhibit 
2-P 
3-P 
5-P 
4-P 
L
 This loan was paid by involuntary offset. 
2
 Explicit reference is made in the assignment to the March 7, 1969, letter, showing 
that the assignment was made after the letter. 
5
 Letters from Bank to Leland Bruderer — date at top of letter. 
1
 Date opposite signature of Leland Bruderer at the bottom of letter. 
* From trial court records. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX B 
The Collateral 
Collateral Per Assignment 
Instrument1 Collateral Per Letter2 
Note 
Secured 
Loan # 1 "Invoices to LDS Church De-
partment of Seminaries and 
Institutes Totaling $18,978.36" 
"Proceeds of their invoices $14,280 
totaling $18,978.36" r 
Loan # 2 "Payment of Invoice num-
bers: 1076, 1038, 1034, 1026, 
1089, 1041, 1043, 1032, 1040, 
1031, 1049, 1047, 1103, 1097, 
1104, 1105, 1107, and 1115 to 
the LDS Church" 
"Proceeds of their invoices # ' s $17,200 
1076, 1038, 1034, 1026, 1089, 
1041, 1043, 1032, 1040, 1031, 
1049, 1047, 1103, 1097, 1104, 
1105, 1107, and 1115, totaling 
$14,047.76" 
Loan # 3 "Invoices as Listed in Letter 
of March 7, 1969 to L.D.S. 
Church. 
Invoice #1091 to Weber 
State College" 
"Proceeds of their invoices # ' s 
1106, 1114, 1036, 1137, 1122, 
1146, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1150, 
1151, 1152, 1153, 1154, 1114, 
1146, 1122, and 1165 for a total 
amount of $10,192.04" 
$14,000 
Loan # 4 "Invoice from Seminaries & 
Institutes, of L.D.S. Church" 
"Proceeds of invoice #1171 in $24,450 
the amount of $34,966" 
1
 As shown on the assignment instrument 
2
 As shown on the letter from the Bank to Leland Bruderer 
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APPENDIX C 
Invoice Data For Loan #2 
Invoice 
# 
1076 
1038 
1034 
1026 
1089 
1041 
1043 
1032 
1040 
1031 
1049 
1047 
1103 
1097 
1104 
1105 
1107 
1115 
Amount 
$2,265.55 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
45.00 
379.00 
711.00 
32.60 
31.00 
356.00 
332.50 
387.25 
35.00 
$2,947.24 
$ 896.00 
Invoice 
Date 
Nov. 25,1968 
Oct. 10,1968 
Oct. 10, 1968 
Oct. 10, 1968 
Dec. 16, 1968 
Oct. 10, 1968 
Oct. 10,1968 
Oct. 10, 1968 
Oct. 10,1968 
Oct. 10,1968 
Oct. 10,1968 
Jan. 6, 1969 
Purchaser 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
No 
evidence 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
No 
evidence 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
No 
evidence 
No 
evidence 
^No 
evidence 
No 
evidence 
Date of i 
Check 
Jan. 21,1969 
Jan. 15,1969 
Jan. 21,1969 
Jan. 21,1969 
Jan. 15,1969 
Exhibit 
3-P-P 
3-P-L 
3-P-J 
3-P-G 
3-P-Q 
3-P-N 
3-P-I 
3-P-M 
3-P-H 
3-P-O 
(Cook 
4 Depo.) 
(Cook 
4 Depo.) 
1
 Included only when check dated before the letter was received by Bruderer (Jan. 15, 
1969), or within one week thereafter. Source—Exhibit 24-D. 
NOTE: Invoice #1036 is included in exhibit 3-P-K but is not included in the assign-
ment nor the letter. Amount — $455.40. 
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APPENDIX D 
Invoice Data For Loan # 3 
[nvoice 
# 
1106 
1114 
1036 
1137 
1122 
1146 
1147 
1148 
1149 
1150 
1151 
1152 
1153 
1154 
1114* 
1146* 
1122* 
1165 
Amount 
$ 455.40 
$ 221.64 
$ 32.00 
$ 43.50 
$ 551.25 
$ 43.50 
$ 63.50 
$ 702.00 
$ 160.00 
$1,907.00 
$1,036.00 
$ 79.50 
Invoice 
Date 
Oct. 10, 1968 
Feb. 14, 1969 
Feb. 5,1969 
Mar. 3,1969 
Mar. 7, 1969 
Mar. 3,1969 
Mar. 7,1969 
Mar. 7,1969 
Mar. 7,1969 
Mar. 7, 1969 
Mar. 7,1969 
Mar. 7,1969 
Purchaser 
No 
evidence * 
No 
evidence x 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
"Sevier 
School 
& Office 
Supply" 
Ch. of Jesus 
Christ of 
Latter-day 
Saints 
"San 
Bernadino 
District 
Seminaries" 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
LDS Church 
Building Dept. 
Church 
Building Dept. 
duplicate 
duplicate 
duplicate 
No evidence1 
Date of 2 
Check 
Mar. 
Mar. 
Mar. 
Mar. 
7,1 
13, 
13, 
13, 
L969 
1969 
1969 
1969 
Exhibit 
5-P-Q 
5-P-P 
5-P-O 
5-P-N 
5-P-M 
25-D 
5-P-K 
5-P-J 
25-D 
5-P-H 
25-D 
25-D 
1
 There are some unidentifiable invoices in evidence that may relate to these numbers. 
2
 Included only when check dated before the letter was received by Bruderer (Mar. 16, 
1969). 
Source: Exhibit 24-D 
15
 NOTE: The duplications are as listed in the letter. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Invoice 
# Amount 
1171 $85.00 
APPENDIX E 
Invoice Data For Loan #4 
Invoice 
Date 
Apr. 17,1969 
Purchaser Exhibit 
L.D.S. 22-D 
School Div. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX F 
Invoices Upon Which Evidence Was Entered and That Were Paid Later 
Than One Week After Bruderer Received The Letter 
Loan #2 
Loan # 3 
Loan #4 
$ 6,932.79 
4,335.25 
85.00 
Total $11,353.04 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY, 
DEC 6 1975 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J . Reuben Clark Law School 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
